South–South Cooperation in the World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Body

Abstract

The South–South Cooperation (SSC) strategy advocates that Global South states cooperate within international organizations to gain bargaining leverage and advance their interests in global governance. The SSC agenda advances a multipolar international system, multilateral negotiations, and mutual economic development, especially for less developed states. This research examines qualitative and quantitative documentation of SSC leadership of Brazil and India in the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Body. The analysis uses case studies of each actor’s profile in trade disputes and cross-tabulations of their success, both individually and collectively against Global North states. The findings support the proposition that Global South states have relatively high rates of success, especially when they collaborate in disputes against the Global North. This research extends the institutional analysis of SSC to the Dispute Settlement Body as an arena for rule-based decision making and adds a qualitative analysis of the SSC leadership and a quantitative analysis of categorical data of trade disputes. The conclusion summarizes the findings and suggests areas for future research.