Ethiopia Federalism's Failure?

Abstract

Ethiopia adopted a federal system in 1995 as a means to manage its complex diversity. The system promises substantial political autonomy to ethnonational and regional groups and fair representation in federal institutions as a means to address age-old demands for inclusion and self-government. Given that Ethiopia is a deeply divided country of minorities where none of the ethnonational groups taken alone constitute a “50 plus 1” majority, this institutional arrangement was meant to address Ethiopia’s main source of conflict. Yet, despite three decades of federal practice, the country continues to face a series of devastating wars. How does one explain this paradox? Why has the federation failed to ensure stability and peace? The article aims to address this central question based on the comparative literature on managing cleavages in deeply divided societies and the analysis and interpretation of recent developments. The findings show there is a mismatch between the demand and supply side of the country’s political system. Six decades of political mobilization for self-government and inclusion by ethnonational groups confront an authoritarian and imperial center that, despite change of regimes and actors, continues to recycle marginalization and centralization. By doing so, Ethiopia has betrayed the core norms of federalism and institutionalized fragility. Contestations between the center and subunits have resulted in devastating wars as centrifugal forces push for inclusion, resource sharing, and self-government. Federalism’s potential to manage and balance unity and diversity has been constrained by the authoritarian imperial center and the regime’s excessive use of violence to crush political demands. Federalism has not failed but has been betrayed in both the past and the present from serving as a venue for intergovernmental bargaining and negotiated reform.