AFRICOM in US Transformational Diplomacy

Abstract

Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007 might have signaled the end of what Abel Esterhuyse has described as a “very cautious and defensive” US approach to its national security involvement in post-World War II Africa. Instead of adopting “a more proactive and preventative approach in protecting and extending US security and other interests in Africa,” Washington “very often lost interest in Africa and, indeed, had to “rediscover” Africa at several junctions during
the post-World War II era.” In this paper, I extend Esterhuyse’s analytical framework to examine the critically important pre-1945 era during which the US laid the foundation
for its post-World War II relations with Africa. This involves the interrogation of three inter-related factors that underscore AFRICOM’s creation, stand-up as a unified combatant command, and relevance to Africa’s contemporary security issues.