Equity in the Distribution of Tax Preferences for Pensions: Capping the Amount Allowable in Tax-Preferenced Retirement Plans

Abstract

Tax-preferenced retirement plans are designed to be vehicles for saving for retirement, not massive tax shelters for wealthy individuals. Because tax preferences for retirement savings cause a loss in federal tax revenue, and are one of the largest sources of tax expenditures, it has long been a principle in pension policy and tax law in the United States and in other countries to limit the amount of retirement tax preferences an individual can receive. Specifically, U.S. tax law sets limits on the maximum benefit provided by a tax-preferenced defined benefit plan and the maximum contribution to either a tax-preferenced defined contribution plan or individual retirement account (“IRA”). It was never the intent of Congress, the tax policy, or pension policy communities that tax-preferenced plans should provide a tax preference for wealthy individuals to accumulate massive savings in retirement plans. Indeed, the conventional understanding of providing tax subsidies for the affluent to save for retirement is not to incentivize them to save, since the affluent will save adequately without such incentives, but to induce them to establish plans to capture tax benefits for themselves and then require them to include rank-and-file employees in the plans thus established. The purpose of the section 415 limits is to control the tax subsidies for the wealthy so that the tax incentives for them to establish plans do not impose excessive revenue loss to the government treasury.