Fostering Fortitude: Patriotism and Resilience as Civic Piety in Textbooks of National Defense Courses in Finland, 1967–2018

Linda Hart

Finnish National Defense University

This article analyzes “National Defense Courses” textbooks that were used to disseminate defense information to the political, social, and administrative elite in Finland. Textbooks from 1967 to 2018 provide qualitative historical and sociological data, showing how Finland has prepared for war and other security contingencies for the past five decades. The main shift in fostering the population’s allegiance to the state has gone from addressing the management of political heterodoxy as a patriotic endeavor to one of cultivating apolitical resilience in the face of adversity. Both patriotism and resilience appear in the texts as forms of civic piety, in which people’s individual preferences give way to collective interests.

Introduction

What binds populations, societies, or, at least, certain strata of a society together to strive for a common goal, such as to defend the sovereignty and independence of the state? Genealogies, life histories, and longtime residence may give rise to emotional attachments and certain ways of thinking, ranging from benign forms of patriotism to chauvinist nationalism. Formal citizenship often comes with legal duties, such as compulsory military service or the obligation to work for the state in times of crisis (Hodgson 2016; Hart and Tallberg 2020). To whom such legal duties apply and what degree of coercion applies varies based on national legislation and such characteristics as age, sex, and mental and physical health (e.g., Hart 2022; see also Kosonen, Puustinen, and Tallberg 2019). Fostering attachment and loyalty to the state may be necessary to maintain its sovereign status as well as its political, social, and cultural institutions. Based on an analysis of defense information in textbooks aimed at Finnish elites, this article argues that civic piety has undergone a social and historical shift in Finland from pluralist patriotism to individual resilience as a way to foster the willingness to defend the state in times of crisis.

In terms of defense policy, Finland is an outlier among European states as a small, non-aligned state outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)1 relying on widely applied male conscription, a large reserve force, and a territorial defense system. Historically, maintaining these choices as the country’s status quo has required a broad-based consensus on defense policy among the Finnish electorate and its elected decision makers. This article analyzes a set of textbooks focused on defense information that were published between 1967 and 2018 and aimed at the Finnish social, political, cultural, scientific, administrative, and military elite—that is, individuals who were experts in their respective fields and were invited to take “National Defense Courses” because of their professional roles. The information collected from these textbooks reveals how attachment to the state has been fostered among the Finnish elite through these invitation-based courses aimed at both civilian experts and military officers.

Over the fifty-year period considered in this study, speaking of “resilience” has become a new way of signaling patriotism in Finland, shedding off uncomfortable tones of superiority vis-à-vis other nations and nationalist-chauvinist thinking. Smith argues that in contrast to nationalism, which he sees as a “deformation of the patriotic spirit” (2021, 116), patriotism acts as a form of civic piety. In Finland, resilience (as conceived in the security and defense realms) replaced patriotism in communicating to citizens the need to prioritize collective survival above individual preference and comfort. In different times, both “pluralist patriotism” and “resilience” have functioned as metaphors for increasing citizens’ willingness to fight for the sovereignty of the state. “Pluralist patriotism” (pluralistinen isänmaallisuus) is a term emphasizing that patriotism can reside both on the political right and left (Eskola 1962a, 1962b; Rainio-Niemi 2014)2 that appeared in the context of the 1960s and “immaterial national defense.” Synonyms for “resilience” appeared from the 1960s onward, but an increase in its use in security policy discourse appeared and intensified in the early twenty-first century. Indeed, the more colloquially known concept of the “willingness to defend Finland” has been a long-running object of interest in both public-opinion surveys and political debate (see Kaarkoski and Häkkinen 2022; Kosonen, Puustinen, and Tallberg 2019). Fostering this willingness is a legally enshrined goal of the Finnish Defense Forces and of state-controlled voluntary defense training (Hadar and Häkkinen 2020; Hart 2022).

The concept of “pluralist patriotism” was highlighted by Eskola (1962a, 1962b), a Finnish sociologist working for the Committee for Immaterial Defense3 in the early 1960s, who was attempting to mitigate the stark left-right divide that was evident in the Finnish Cold War political climate. Over time, however, linguistic references to patriotism vanished from the National Defense Courses textbooks and were replaced by references to societal resilience. Even in the printed information on defense that was disseminated, “patriotism” became a lofty word that appeared in quotes and referred to constitutional national defense duty. Section 127 of the Constitution of Finland stipulates that all adult Finns are under the obligation to defend the state in crisis. “Patriotism” also appears in other printed material that addresses the values of the Finnish Defense Forces such as the Soldier’s Guide (Defense Command 2020, 202), a textbook given to Finnish conscripts during military service.

In the place of patriotism, the notion of “resilience,” brought down to the individual level and sanitized of any specific political leanings or affective attachment to the polity, became the central paradigm. Bergström defines resilience as a quality that is desired from a state’s population in emergencies: “In recent years, the notion of resilience has come to represent the optimistic belief in, and the call for, citizens, households, local communities, cities, and nations to adapt to societal disruptions, and the immediate effects of natural disasters and human threats (terror attacks or military intervention)” (2018, 32). In this context, both “patriotism” and “resilience” are underpinned by the common goal of maintaining the state’s independence. As such, the civic virtue that was traditionally framed as putting aside political differences for a common goal morphed into displaying loyalty by possessing the quality of “resilience,” both at the collective and the individual levels. This may be understood as fortitude in dealing with “all security situations” (National Defense University 2011, 133), a euphemistic expression used in the 2011 textbook that signaled a broad-based understanding of comprehensive security while being grounded in the notion of being prepared for war.

In this article, textbooks for the National Defense Courses produced by the Finnish Defense Forces and assisting institutions, such as government ministries, are analyzed to assess how attachment, adherence, and allegiance to the state have been communicated to Finnish elites from the late 1960s to the late 2010s. The textbooks are analyzed to determine the terminology that is deployed in different eras to specify how citizens should relate to the state and to each other as a nation and polity. The analysis is related to “citizen persuasion”—that is, how leaders and citizens are invited to position themselves vis-à-vis the state and to act when expressing their civic loyalty (see Howell and Kriner 2013; Lee, Tsohou, and Choi 2017). In the data, making normative statements about how to relate to the state is largely avoided. Most of the textbook content of the National Defense Courses is descriptive and technical, explaining how national defense is organized and how it is served by different societal sectors, such as public administration, finance, healthcare, and education. However, if the state did not compel conscripts to train and be prepared to fight in the worst of conditions, and if the country’s elites were indifferent about the kind of state in which they work, would the state hold together in a time of military attack? Despite the technocratic tone of the textbooks, affective attachment and loyalty are evoked in a low-key manner. The current analysis focuses on the concepts that are used to do this.

The article is structured in five parts. First, I introduce a theoretical framework that builds on the conceptual shift from constitutional to civic patriotism (Laborde 2002), running parallel with the shift from pluralist patriotism to resilience and with modes of thought that underpin advanced liberal governance, according to Pat O’Malley (2010) and as described below. Second, I introduce the data, the methodology, and the historical and social context of the courses. In the third and fourth sections, I analyze the data, first from the 1960s to the 1990s and then from the 1990s to the 2020s. Finally, in the conclusion I discuss the data in light of the conceptual issues surrounding liberal governance.

From Managing Differences in Political Ideologies to Embracing Resilient Subjects

In her work on patriotism as a civic virtue, Ben-Porath, a political philosopher, defined patriotism as “a sense of affiliation with one’s nation as an actual geopolitical phenomenon from which one receives various material and other goods, as well as a commitment to this nation as a shared project with one’s fellow countrymen” (2007, 45). Ben-Porath’s approach to patriotism is pragmatic as well as normative. That is, she sees patriotism as an outlook that can be taught in schools as part of citizenship education. Elsewhere she takes up the theme of “shared fate” (2011) in the face of war as a binding force driving and giving rise to patriotic thinking. To Ben-Porath, patriotism is less a moral virtue than a civic virtue, “dependent on place and time” (2007, 42). As a sentiment rather than a judgment, patriotism does not require logical arguments to support it, but is rather an affective bond.

In contrast to nationalism, where love of country takes on a negative connotation because one elevates one’s own country above others, patriotism has an aura of acceptability that can be used to foster a hierarchical relationship between the collectivity and its members due to its benign and emotive essence (see Viroli 1995). According to Smith, “nationalism is not patriotism’s exact opposite but a deformation of the patriotic spirit. Patriotism is closer to civic piety—a form of civic bonding over a life in common—than nationalist self-assertion” (2021, 116). The hierarchy between the state and its subjects rests on a structure where both belonging and social status can be signaled through expressions of loyalty, virtue, piety, and fortitude.

The story of Finland within the National Defense Courses textbooks can be described as a tale of two sociohistorical shifts. First, there is a change in tone and discourse from the political differences of the Finnish population (Eskola 1962b; Aunesluoma and Rainio-Niemi 2016) during the Cold War to an emphasis that the subjects of a democratic state will contribute to the state’s security (O’Malley 2010; Bergström 2018; Larsson 2021). The second story concerns a conceptual bridge from a Habermasian constitutional patriotism to civic patriotism, as proposed by Laborde (2002; see also Rainio-Niemi 2019).

Habermasian constitutional patriotism is treated here as a parallel to Eskola’s notion of “pluralist patriotism” (1962a, 1962b) where, in the field of immaterial defense, the political and civic educational project of Finland during the Cold War was about engaging citizens to commit themselves to a common security cause. Reflecting on both the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union and the history of European states after World War II, Habermas developed his notion of constitutional patriotism in the late 1990s. According to Habermas,

The political culture of a country crystallizes around its constitution. Each national culture develops a distinctive interpretation of those constitutional principles that are equally embodied in other republican constitutions … in light of its own national history. A “constitutional patriotism” based on these interpretations can take the place originally occupied by nationalism. (1999, 188)

The political goal was the same after World War II and in the early twenty-first century. However, today’s argument springs from a liberal-leaning and individual-centered point of departure: If one is a pious citizen toward the state, one is resilient in the face of adversity both as an individual and in one’s role within the larger society, be it a citizen-soldier, leader, or a civilian.

Moving away from Habermasian constitutional patriotism, Laborde defines patriotism as “citizens’ attachment to their national institutions [that] can be instrumental in fostering the virtues essential to the legitimacy and stability of liberal democracy” (2002, 591). She argues that the school of political thought built around Habermasian constitutional patriotism sees patriotic orientation as acceptable if it is attached to “universalist-orientated political constitutions” (592). This debate on patriotism as a political orientation and attachment focuses mostly on the management of cultural diversity. However, the concept also overlaps with diverse political orientations and may be applied to building consensus with the rationale of defending a state entity. Laborde also argues that constitutional patriotism falls short of both legitimacy and inclusiveness as “it fails to take seriously the need for cultural mediations between citizens and their institutions” (592). She proposes a patriotism with a “civic” label, which she maintains will better recognize how “particularist political cultures” are recognized in the implementation of universalist principles.

To what is civic piety—be it conveyed as patriotism, fortitude, or resilience—directed? At a minimum, it is a shared constitution and a form of (democratic) rule. Patriotism and other affective forms of allegiance must be fostered in a low-key manner in liberal democracies, particularly when these forms of allegiance are connected to militaries. O’Malley asks, “What is the relationship between the question of military resilience and the political order of liberal democracy” (2010, 494)? To answer this question, he paraphrases Lord Moran, Winston Churchill’s private physician, who wrote about courage and fortitude in the context of World War II. O’Malley writes that the will to fight is linked to striving for an idealized notion of freedom, which in turn is linked to a liberal polity. In authoritarian regimes it is seen as acceptable to train children for warfare, but this would be nearly unthinkable in contemporary democracies (2010, 494).

Social Context, Data, and Method: “National Defense Courses” in Finland

Finland is a small state that recently celebrated its centenary of independence. The country maintains a robust military for its size and modest significance on the world stage. Its defense policy relies on male conscription, engaging nearly two-thirds (65 percent in 2021) of young males (Ministry of Defense 2021, 71), or about two-fifths (40 percent in 2021) of its combined male and female population.4 Finland also boasts widespread public support among citizens who believe in defending the country against an external aggressor when asked about the “willingness to defend Finland,” as measured in annual opinion polls taken since the Cold War (Forsberg and Pesu 2017; Kosonen, Puustinen, and Tallberg 2019; Kosonen 2019). Both to educate and to encourage its political, economic, scientific, and cultural elite to be favorable to the defense sector, the Finnish Defense Forces offer “National Defense Courses” that were created in the 1960s and have been given since then. Attendance is invitation-based. The courses last approximately three weeks, are offered four times a year, enjoy a certain aura of mystery in the public imagination, and are known to foster both networking and cohesion among the Finnish elite, which ranges from members of Parliament to business leaders (Kolbe 2011; see also Ruostetsaari 2015).

The impetus for organizing the courses came from Finland’s Defense Council, founded in 1956. Reflecting on the experiences of World War II, the council decided to implement joint training for military and civilian leaders. Implementation was assigned to the chief of the Finnish Defense Forces, and the first course was offered in 1961 (Kolbe 2011; Ekholm 2006). As indicated above, the National Defense Courses act as a forum where Finnish elites create networks and alliances that are believed to prepare them to act decisively and in cooperation with the armed forces at a time of potential crisis. It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the confidential nature of the courses, the textbooks produced for them are publicly available. Despite consisting primarily of straightforward, technical, and administrative information on how the state is run in times of crisis, the courses together with the textbooks are an example of how a modest, diplomatic, low-key patriotic message can be disseminated to participants.

Between 1961 and 1965 about six hundred people attended the courses, with considerable representation from state administration, business and industry, and the defense and border control sectors. Smaller groups of participants came from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), parliamentarians, academia, and the media (Kolbe 2011, 48). By the end of 2020 the course had been completed by a little over 9,600 people; of these, 17 percent of total participants were women, and 88 percent were civilians rather than professional soldiers. In 2020, women comprised 38 percent of participants, while 92 percent were civilians. Over the years, about 8 percent of the participants have been members of Parliament. In this context, it is important to note that, when the Advisory Board for Defense Education (Maanpuolustusopetuksen neuvottelukunta) selects participants, an attempt is made to see to political diversity, and politicians from different political parties are invited to attend. The share of parliamentarians that have completed the course roughly corresponds to their parties’ share of seats in Parliament, both when it comes to existing parties and for political parties that no longer hold seats (National Defense Courses 2021; Kolbe 2011).

The textbooks are edited by officers and experts who manage the courses, and the chapters have been written by civil servants, experts in economics, civil protection, medicine, and technology, as well as various defense and foreign-policy intellectuals. Until the 1990s, the writers were almost exclusively male and from a small circle of experts. In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, as the emphasis on comprehensive security grew, the pool of writers was slightly broadened and diversified. The few female writers tended to be diplomats, lawyers in public administration, and various civil servants. Along the way, some academics have also been included, usually due to their expertise in a specific area, such as science or technology.

This research project uses nineteen of these textbooks published between 1967 and 2018 as data. (A list of the books and their titles is provided at the end of this article.) As previously stated, the content and spirit of the textbooks are designed to deliver technocratic information about how national defense and adjacent fields are organized in Finland. As practical and relatively indisputable information, the content serves to acquaint readers with the duties that different sectors of Finnish society (for example, finance, healthcare, and local administration) have in times of crisis. For the purposes of the current analysis, this article focuses on the sections of these books regarding intangible and highly political phenomena, such as the overall rationale for defending Finland, the willingness to fight, and the immaterial, social, and psychological dimensions of national defense. The textual analysis proceeds in a chronological manner, comparing and contrasting relevant sections of the textbooks.

As mentioned above, the earliest available textbooks are from 1967 and 1968. Over time, however, the textbooks evolve both in format and in content, going through an overhaul once every ten years or so. The books have four different titles, translated as Information on Different Sectors of National Defense (Lehti and Siilasvuo 1967; Tervasmäki and Pajunen 1968), Information on National Defense (Tervasmäki and Pajunen 1969; Haukilahti 1973; Defense Command 1976; Artema and Training Department 1978; Defense Command 1980; Artema and Defense Command 1984; Paetau, Andersson, and Artema 1986; Artema et al. 1988; Artema 1992; National Defense University 1996; National Defense University 2002), Information on Total Defense in Finland (Haltia 2006), and Secure Finland (National Defense University 2011; National Defense University 2012; Mattson and Mikkola 2013; National Defense University et al. 2014; National Defense University et al. 2015; Eskola et al. 2018). The central theme of the books evolves from national defense as part and parcel of foreign and security policy in the late 1960s to “total defense” from the late 1970s and onward to “comprehensive security” in the early 2000s and 2010s (Valtonen and Branders 2020). In fact, the Secure Finland textbooks in the late 2010s strive to communicate a holistic view of societal security rather than one focused on the military.

I use three insights from O’Malley regarding the “analytics of advanced liberal governance” as conceptual tools to analyze the data and unpack the different sociohistorical processes present in the compilation of books. Specifically, O’Malley draws upon the use and development of “resilience” in Anglophone military discourse in recent decades to argue that, in this discourse, “resilience” fosters “three linked changes familiar to the analytics of advanced liberal governance. These are: the prioritization of anticipatory governance; the valorization of individuals as managers of their own risks; and a shift in the role of expertise from that of assuming technocratic responsibility to that of ‘empowerment’ and ‘support’” (2010, 499). Regarding the larger frame of the “analytics of advanced liberal governance,” all three changes can be seen in Finnish security and defense policies. Indeed, detailed planning for both war during the Cold War and for the present illustrates that anticipatory governance as well as the valorization of individual citizens as “producers” and agents of security led to the rise of “resilience”—that is, the aptitude for mental endurance through crisis. While technocratic expertise stands strong, it is accompanied by empowering and supporting individuals and communities to “take responsibility” for their own well-being and crisis readiness.

From National Defense as Part of Foreign Policy to Total Defense: 1960s to 1990s

The idea of “pluralist patriotism” (Eskola 1962b; see also Rainio-Niemi 2014, 185) appears in the 1967 and 1968 textbooks as a concept drawn from applied sociological research on defense attitudes during the Cold War. At that time, Eskola analyzed patriotism as a relationship between the individual and the collective, arguing that a number of variables contribute to it. These variables include such benefits to the individual as affective relations to others, appreciation from others for belonging to the group, and activities that are of interest to the individual (1962b, 8). In terms of Finnish political history, the late 1960s were also the heyday of “immaterial national defense” (also referred to as “psychological” or “spiritual” defense; see, for example, Aunesluoma and Rainio-Niemi 2016; Rainio-Niemi 2014; Juntunen and Hyvönen 2020). In the Finnish context, “pluralist patriotism” referred to attempts to manage the political differences between right-leaning conservatives, centrists, and left-wing actors, some of them radically pro-Soviet.

Thus, in the early textbooks, pluralist patriotism is offered as a mediating concept—as something that could bring different political actors together, contributing to their willingness to defend Finland against foreign aggression. Factors contributing to this patriotism include attachment to one’s country, the defense of a democratic system of governance, and a shared desire of the citizenry to maintain peace (Eskola 1962b). This resonates with a finding by Aunesluoma and Rainio-Niemi, who have studied the history of the Committee for Immaterial Defense, an official state committee created for the purpose of surveying citizens’ attitudes toward defense policy and modeled on Swedish defense policies of the time. According to Aunesluoma and Rainio-Niemi, the committee realized that “in the context of the ideological Cold War, patriotism itself—its key concepts, values, sources of motivation, and objectives—had to be redefined and ‘modernized’” (2016, 64; see also Forsberg and Pesu 2016). The later repackaging of patriotism led to the disappearance of the term “patriotism” in the texts, with emphasis placed instead on the “willingness to defend Finland” as an object of public opinion and on an early precursor of “resilience,” the “mental ability to withstand crises.”

In general, however, the rationale for defending Finland in 1967–68 was presented as involving five sectors: administrative, economic, military, psychological, and civilian protection. Among these, however, the willingness to fight, a political sentiment or a psychological factor, was presented as the most essential quality: “Spirit is more important than material. A strong willingness to fight has in olden days been able to make up for a lot of material deficiencies. The situation will not be different in future wars either” (Lehti and Siilasvuo 1967, 4). The political threat and war imagery of the post–World War II period shifted toward “total war”—that is, the entire country and its people would be under attack, both figuratively and concretely. Preparedness for such a war required action and planning during peacetime. Thus, national defense was seen as composed of a large set of activities, of which military functions were only a part.

In a chapter on psychological defense in the first textbook, the evolution of attitudes and fortitude was described as a process of optimistic reconstruction. It was admitted that depression and apathy existed in Finland after World War II, but this collective sentiment was replaced by optimism in the possibilities of Finland obtaining a place among developed and industrialized nations. The chapter also mentioned that “protecting and maintaining shared values” received heightened political attention in the 1960s (Lehti and Siilasvuo 1967, 2–3). Positive developments in Finland after World War II included “strong social development” in tandem with the accumulation of material wealth, the growth of international interactions in politics and business, and new emphases in the country’s foreign policy.

It is important to note that the “emphases in foreign policy” referred to above may be understood as a political euphemism for tiptoeing around the political interests of the Soviet Union. During this time, 90 percent of Finns preferred non-alignment as their security policy (Lehti and Siilasvuo 1967, 10). The conclusion of these earliest textbooks was that trust between citizens and between citizens and Finnish societal institutions must be maintained to overcome potential crises. This was seen as important for maintaining social stability, as there was explicit speculation that poorer Finnish citizens might not possess a high “willingness to fight” due to their preoccupation with money and their low levels of education (Lehti and Siilasvuo 1967, 2–4).

Signs of an early precursor to the concept of “resilience” (henkinen kestokyky, literally translated as “mental endurance”) surfaced in the 1969 textbook. The word differed markedly from the loan word kriisinsietokyky (the “ability to withstand crises”), which was used in the 2010s and often substituted by the term resilienssi (resilience). For example, henkinen kestokyky was deployed to describe periods in World War II in Finland (for example, the Continuation War of 1941–44, also known as the Second Soviet-Finnish War) when “the economic and mental resilience of the whole Finnish population became even more significant than before in warfare” (Tervasmäki and Pajunen 1969, 11).

In the 1973 textbook the term patriotism was explicitly engaged, but in a somewhat conceptually inconsistent manner. According to Blomstedt, the author of the relevant chapter, patriotism, especially “overt patriotism,” meaning chauvinist patriotism leaning toward nationalism, was often erroneously equated in Finland with the willingness to defend the country (Haukilahti 1973, 199–200). Blomstedt wanted to underline that patriotism and a willingness to defend were different attitudes in both quality and intensity. Blomstedt equated patriotism with nationalism—that is, placing one’s country consciously and unequivocally above other countries. The willingness to defend was seen as patriotism in its usual meaning—that is, as love for one’s country, but at the same time considering one’s country in an equal position to others (Haukilahti 1973, 199–200).

In the 1980 textbook a generational shift was noted in terms of the willingness to defend Finland. It now acknowledged that the younger generation, lucky enough to have lived during peacetime with no direct relationship to the realities of World War II, was now the generation that would be asked to take up arms. This anomaly was further highlighted by noting that, due to Finland’s swift industrialization and urbanization, 1980s Finland was now a “well-to-do” society and among the twenty wealthiest economies of the world (Defense Command 1980, 281). Given these changes, it was argued that Finland was now even worthier of defense than before.

In 1971 and 1981 the parliamentary defense committees were at work preparing reports. The 1971 report stated that there was no need to develop or maintain a specific “ideology of national defense” (quoted in Defense Command 1980, 281). This disavowal of designing a particular dogma for Finnish national defense led to the fostering of civic loyalty to national defense in a low-key manner. This can be argued to be in line with the principles of a democratic, non-totalitarian society (O’Malley 2010). Thus, the will to defend was seen as an underlying characteristic of Finnish society, a basic readiness of citizens to make sacrifices for society and their own security (Defense Command 1980, 281). To a certain extent, elites could take for granted that Finns possessed at least some willingness to resist and fight off a foreign aggression. However, one’s willingness to resist and fight could vary depending on the political situation or the politicians in charge at the time of crisis. Patriotic loyalty could be relied upon if people were about to lose what was valuable to them, such as their homes, their language, or their status as an independent political community (Defense Command 1980, 281).

The 1984 textbook began to develop the notion of fortitude (kestokyky), a precursor to “resilience.” “History demonstrates that the number of weapons alone does not decide the fate of peoples in war. Other resources, material and immaterial, are measured” (Artema and Defense Command 1984, 233). The foundation for the later development of the resilience paradigm was laid by aligning war with other societal risks and tying managing and enduring those risks to fortitude. Moreover, fortitude could be the object of citizen education, as it was necessary for the general survival of the population and not only for war preparation. In a democratic welfare state, the basis of national defense was seen as based on heterodox values and divergent political affiliations, as opposed to religious and political dogmas, which could also evoke a high willingness to make personal and collective sacrifices.

The willingness to fight was also seen as requiring knowledge-based arguments. However, it was also acknowledged that affective attachments played a role, as “undoubtedly motivation is based also on emotional values” (Artema and Defense Command 1984, 233.) Thus, the 1988 textbook had much the same wording as that of the 1984 textbook (Artema et al. 1988, 261–62). As for the motivation to defend the country, public-opinion surveys showed rather consistently that the most important motivation was independence. About a quarter of respondents evoked the value of “homeland” or “fatherland” alongside independence. Moreover, about half of respondents believed that nothing could diminish their will to defend (Artema et al. 1988, 262).

In the early 1990s, in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the textbook for the National Defense Courses was considerably rewritten. In the 1992 textbook, for example, the willingness to fight was not allotted a specific section in the book and, in fact, received only rather passing mentions. Instead, there was greater reflection and emphasis on questions of world politics, such as disarmament, arms control, lessons from the Gulf War, and peacekeeping within the United Nations. The relationship of the population to defending the country was discussed briefly under the rubric of the Finnish Defense Forces’ communications activities with a short passage: “External communications will focus on conveying to the world information on the ability and willingness of Finland to fight” (Artema 1992, 269). Finally, a precursor of O’Malley’s analytics was articulated, as it was mentioned that the “mental resilience of the population” would be supported and that “information and instructions relevant to total defense” would be disseminated to the public (269).

The Rise of Resilience and Comprehensive Security in a Nordic Welfare State: Early Twenty-First Century

The first two decades of the twenty-first century saw the rise of “comprehensive security” (kokonaisturvallisuus) as a government-approved model for cooperation between government authorities, business and industries, NGOs, other types of communities (such as religious and informal ones), and individual citizens (Valtonen and Branders 2020; Virta and Branders 2016). Comprehensive security is therefore a holistic approach to managing security threats through coordination and cooperation between governmental, private, and civil society actors. The model draws from different sources. On the one hand, it draws from the “hard” realm of business (Mäkinen 2007) and war studies. In its earlier incarnations it was called “total defense” and “comprehensive defense” (see Juntunen and Hyvönen 2020) within a military-dominated national order of preparedness following World War II. On the other hand, in both its linguistic form and conceptual implications, comprehensive security has affinities with the “soft” and feminist notions of human security and the so-called comprehensive approach in the field of international relations (Hudson 2005).

Analysis of textbooks for National Defense Courses written between 2000 and 2018 reveals that despite underlying theoretical aspirations toward a soft and holistic approach, the Finnish model of comprehensive security has morphed into a technocratic and bureaucratic management tool. This bureaucratic model was described by a secretary general who was stepping down from heading Finland’s Security Committee, a body created for the purpose of coordinating comprehensive security within Finnish public administration, as an excellent model worthy of export to other states (Virtanen 2015). However, despite attempts to broaden Finnish understandings of security, the comprehensive security model emerged as a technocratic and bureaucratic construct, falling short of its holistic potential of opening up security as a “soft,” day-to-day, top-down activity.

In the 2006 textbook, the willingness to fight was still the central tenet, and maintaining it continued to be the “most important element of psychological warfare” (Haltia 2006, 397). Maintaining the will to defend was a task for the state already in peacetime and not just in a state of emergency. Mass communication was the tool to be used in promoting the willingness to defend among the population at large. Willingness to defend referred not only to the willingness to fight held by conscripts and reservists but also to political support for war efforts from the wider public. According to the textbook, this was to be done by providing the public with “factual and sufficient information” regarding military defense (397).

Textbooks published from 2011 onward are publicly available online. In the 2011 textbook, the general rationale for defending Finland is that defense is a contingency for which the state needs to be prepared. The textbook states that even though people’s understanding of security has changed and broadened, military conflicts continue to occupy an important place in the politics of threat, and significant risks continue to exist for the Finnish population: “Wars and armed conflicts are not disappearing from the world” (National Defense University 2011, 19). The only overt reference to patriotism was in reference to the Constitution of Finland (§ 127), which states that defending the fatherland is the duty of all Finns. In this context, the Finnish armed forces are presented as tackling a variety of threats, including international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Domestically, the textbook focuses on disasters, disruptions to energy supplies, and the effects of extreme environmental events. The focus is also extended to potential benefits to the male population, including the prevention of social marginalization, the integration of immigrants who become Finnish citizens before passing the age for completing military service (18–30 years), and the promotion of public health (National Defense University 2011, 19).

As to the rationale of defending Finland, it is argued that the rule of law is a tool of social cohesion: “Especially in crisis situations and states of emergency the conduct [of the armed forces] … is of special importance to foster the trust of the population” (National Defense University 2011, 23). However, compared to previous years, one detects a change in threat politics in the 2011 text. Specifically, the importance of broad-based security thinking is emphasized, as is the concept of comprehensive security and making use of all of society’s resources. Finnish society is described as increasingly vulnerable, and this vulnerability calls for engaging with the private sector and civil society for the sake of preparedness (27). To that end, the book argues that resilience is not just steadfastness in the face of adversity but that it is also underpinned by a willingness to strive for the benefit of the nation and to pull through mental and physical challenges in a time of crisis. Resilience can be seen in the will of the citizens to act for the purpose of maintaining state independence as well as the sustenance of the population, among other things (133). The mental resilience behind the “will to act” is said to be fostered through mass communication, lessons taught in school, the protection of cultural heritage, and religious services.

Schools, in particular, are supposed to make the constitutional duty of national defense more comprehensible to citizens (National Defense University 2011, 134–35). The rationale is that teaching about the principles, solutions, and the implementation of Finnish security politics would induce a willingness to defend the nation among citizens as well as broad-based political support for (male) conscription. In reality, however, this is not explicitly the case. As a result of the post–World War II political climate, the curriculum for comprehensive education—that is, first through ninth grade—as well as for secondary education (which generally encompasses students aged sixteen to nineteen) has been purposefully stripped of military-oriented topics. Instead, it has been the protection of cultural heritage that has dealt more with national defense and war-making due to its focus on maintaining war memorials and producing knowledge regarding the legacy of World War II (1939–44), the Finnish Civil War (1917–18), and other war history from the time of Russian and Swedish rule.

The 2014 text largely echoes the same content and formulation: “The mental resilience of the nation is manifested in the willingness of the citizens to act to maintain state sovereignty, the living conditions of the population and security” (National Defense University et al. 2014, 290). According to the text, mental resilience is fostered through education, public communication, religious activities, and the protection of cultural heritage (290). Furthermore, the citizens’ mental resilience could be enhanced by incorporating into education different kinds of societal threats, and comprehensive schools could be one forum for influencing the population at a young age. Schoolteachers were thus seen as having a central role in channeling and fostering defense-related attitudes (291).

A slight change of tone and style can be noted in the 2018 textbook.5 Technocratic militarism is downplayed by making defense capability only one of nine topics covered together with internal security. According to the text, defense capability is maintained through perennial investment into military preparedness, arms, and human resources, including a large reserve force, and conscription, which was seen as a staple of Finnish manhood. In recent years, the threat imagery has shifted and focused on the need to respond rapidly, the ability to thwart a large-scale attack by a foreign power and the fostering of societal “resilience.” In the language of the 2018 textbook, resilience translates into the ability of security professionals, citizen-soldiers, and civilians to take action in a time of crisis (Eskola et al. 2018).

Thus, by the late 2010s the goal of defending the state and keeping it together both as a territory and as a community happens through individuals acting as managers of impending risks. This resonates a great deal with O’Malley’s analysis of liberal governance and the “valorization of individuals as managers of their own risks” (2010, 499). Secure Finland, the 2018 textbook, lays it out as such:

In addition to non-governmental organizations, active citizens are a vital component of a resilient society. Individuals are more and more important security actors with the choices they make and what they do, as well as members of their families and local communities. The knowledge, skills, and security-enhancing attitude of an individual form the basis of societal resilience. The will to participate and help is manifested also in social media networks and independent peer groups. These are part and parcel of civil society and at their best strengthen the resilience of society. (Eskola et al. 2018, 11)

The hues of patriotism remaining in the 2018 textbook are not phrased in a grandiloquent manner, but in simple terms: “Finns’ high willingness to fight is the basis of defense capability and societal resilience,” and “it is the job of every Finn to defend the nation” (Eskola et al. 2018, 62). While explicit mentions of patriotism (isänmaa, isänmaallisuus) became rare in the literature as of 1990, in the early 2000s and 2010s mentions of patriotism tend to appear when referring to the Constitution of Finland6 regarding Finnish citizens’ national defense duty (National Defense University et al. 2014, 291; Eskola et al. 2018, 63) as well as in reference to societal cohesion and the willingness to defend Finland (Eskola et al. 2018, 70). Technocratic preparation was also seen as contributing to trust in the state. Deterrence was also an important component, sending the message that it is not worth one’s time to attack Finland. In these textbooks, a high willingness to fight was accounted for by the existence of conscription, the availability of voluntary defense training for both reservists and civilians, and a cohesive Finnish mentality. It is interesting to note that neither data nor sources are provided to substantiate these claims. Rather, a narrative is given according to which “the Finnish mentality is that no one is left behind” (Eskola et al. 2018, 70). As a result, the welfare state and the universal services it provides daily are cited as both the source and the object of the willingness to defend the country.

Conclusion: Patriotism and Resilience as Forms of Civic Piety

The Finnish National Defense Course textbooks illustrate a conceptual shift in Finland from an attempt to manage diversity of political outlooks through “pluralist patriotism” to valorizing individual and collective forms of “resilience” if they are in the service of securing state sovereignty when the state is under threat. Out of O’Malley’s (2010) three variables of liberal governance, the prioritization of anticipatory governance intensified in the Finnish security landscape from 1967 to 2018. The increasing valorization of individuals is at least partly due to preparing for risks that are associated with contemporary forms of everyday life where digitalization of society plays an important role. Technocratic responsibility, however, reigns in the hierarchical structure of security administration. It is also an organizing principle in the division of labor between citizens in times of crisis characterized by male conscription and a large reserve force. A shift from technocratic responsibility to empowerment and support is perhaps underway. Both pluralist patriotism and resilience act as labels for civic piety. This entails decentering the primacy of one’s political faction or one’s personal and group affiliations to serve the state and to survive both as individuals and as a polity. The textbooks do not focus on national pride, but rather on the possession of individual and collective qualities through which potential sacrifices can be channeled and executed.

The Finnish National Defense Courses are aimed at the social, political, and administrative elite of Finland and provide a high-level forum for influencing attitudes toward foreign and security policy, the armed forces as an institution, and military expenditures. From the courses’ establishment in the 1960s, the tone of the textbooks has mainly been straightforward and technocratic, and much of the substantive information has related to state administration, finance, or the operation of the military complex. However, to a limited extent and in a low-key manner, the textbooks have also communicated what is necessary in the sociopolitical and, perhaps, psychosocial context to defend Finland, arguing that the country must secure its sovereignty “in all security situations,” which in the context of the twentieth century and Finnish memory politics refers to military conflict with the former Soviet Union.

This is not new. Indeed, since World War II the threat of war and the maintenance of deterrence have been staples of Finnish statehood. During the Cold War, the rhetoric of patriotism—indeed, the spirit of Habermasian constitutional patriotism—existed: by acknowledging and keeping party-political differences at bay, Finns were enabled and prepared to defend their state. Thus, patriotism, in that instance, referred to the love of country and community. It was referred to explicitly by citing a sociologist (Eskola 1962a, 1962b) who attempted to capture a key societal conflict—the left-right divide that existed in the Soviet Union’s shadow—by referring to “pluralist patriotism,” as if to remind the population that they had one common goal. After all, to paraphrase Ben-Porath (2011), if war can be understood as “shared fate” amid the unpredictability of world politics, something is needed—that is, patriotism—to unite the population. Later, when turning to the early twenty-first century, resilience became the desired quality for persisting in the face of adversity.

Be it patriotism (sanitized of emotion), the willingness to support and take part in defending the state, or resilience in the face of all possible forms of large-scale adversity, mass communication was expected to foster these collective goods through the dissemination of “factual information.” As argued above, in Finnish defense communication textbooks, the main body of the texts consisted of technocratic information on how national defense was organized and executed. Thus, our question has been how the immaterial motivation to defend the state was “packaged” in different eras. While “pluralist patriotism” was not a concept in wide circulation among different societal classes in the 1960s, an attempt was made to capture how citizens could be directed toward the larger goal of maintaining an independent state despite their political differences. After all, division in Finnish society had been rife in the early decades of the country’s independence due to the 1917–18 civil war.

What finally emerged in the textbooks (both during the Cold War and up to the present) was a narrative arguing for the importance of preparedness for the survival of a small state that was tied to varying forms of patriotic commitment. An emphasis was placed on defending a modern democracy that adheres to liberal values. The rationale for defending Finland continues to rest on the importance of maintaining the state’s sovereignty—a value that is consistently supported by public-opinion polls (see Advisory Board for Defense Information 2021 and earlier years). Thus, drawing a simple analogy between the willingness to defend Finland and patriotism is easy to do. If patriotism is an affective attachment to the homeland, the willingness to fight may be phrased in such terms as defending the country’s national institutions, its economic interests, its citizens, and democracy as a form of governance.

Chronological List of National Defense Course Textbooks Analyzed

Lehti, O. J., and E. Siilasvuo. 1967. Tietoja maanpuolustuksen eri aloilta 1967 [Information on different sectors of national defense 1967]. Helsinki: Topografikunta.

Tervasmäki, V., and A. Pajunen. 1968. Tietoja maanpuolustuksen eri aloilta [Information on different sectors of national defense]. Helsinki: Topografikunta.

Tervasmäki, V., and A. Pajunen. 1969. Tietoja maanpuolustuksesta: maanpuolustus turvallisuuspolitiikan osana [Information on national defense: National defense as a part of security policy]. Helsinki: Defense Command.

Haukilahti, V. 1973. Tietoja maanpuolustuksesta: maanpuolustus turvallisuuspolitiikan osana. [Information on national defense: National defense as a part of security policy]. Helsinki: Defense Command.

Defense Command. 1976. Tietoja maanpuolustuksesta: maanpuolustus turvallisuuspolitiikan osana [Information on national defense: National defense as a part of security policy]. Helsinki: Defense Command.

Artema, K., and Training Department. 1978. Uppgifter om försvaret: försvaret som del av säkerhetspolitiken [Information on national defense: National defense as a part of security policy]. Helsinki: Defense Command.

Defense Command. 1980. Tietoja maanpuolustuksesta: maanpuolustus turvallisuuspolitiikan osana [Information on national defense: National defense as a part of security policy]. Helsinki: Defense Command, Training Department. Koulutusosasto.

Artema, Kalervo, and Defense Command. 1984. Tietoja maanpuolustuksesta: maanpuolustus turvallisuuspolitiikan osana [Information on national defense: National defense as a part of security policy]. Helsinki: Defense Command.

Paetau, H., B. Andersson, and K. Artema. 1986. Om vårt försvar: försvaret, en del av vår säkerhetspolitik [Information on national defense: National defense as a part of security policy]. Helsinki: Defense Command.

Artema, Kalervo, et al. 1988. Tietoja maanpuolustuksesta: maanpuolustus turvallisuuspolitiikan osana [Information on national defense: National defense as a part of security policy]. Helsinki: Defense Administration.

Artema, Kalervo. 1992. Tietoja maanpuolustuksesta: maanpuolustus turvallisuuspolitiikan osana [Information on national defense: National defense as a part of security policy]. Helsinki: Defense Command.

National Defense University. 1996. Tietoja maanpuolustuksesta 1996: maanpuolustus ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan osana [Information on national defense 1996: National defense as a part of security policy]. Helsinki: National Defense University.

National Defense University. 2002. Tietoja maanpuolustuksesta 2002: maanpuolustus ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan osana [Information on national defense 2002: National defense as a part of security policy]. Helsinki: National Defense University.

Haltia, J. 2006. Tietoja Suomen kokonaismaanpuolustuksesta 2006 [Information on the total defense of Finland 2006]. Helsinki: National Defense University.

National Defense University. 2011. Turvallinen Suomi: tietoja Suomen kokonaisturvallisuudesta [Secure Finland: Information on the comprehensive security of Finland]. Helsinki: National Defense University.

National Defense University. 2012. Turvallinen Suomi: tietoja Suomen kokonaisturvallisuudesta [Secure Finland: Information on the comprehensive security of Finland]. Helsinki: National Defense University.

Mattson, K., and T. Mikkola. 2013. Turvallinen Suomi: tietoja Suomen kokonaisturvallisuudesta [Secure Finland: Information on the comprehensive security of Finland]. Helsinki: National Defense University.

National Defense University, National Defense Courses, Security Committee, and Heikki Välivehmas. 2014. Turvallinen Suomi: tietoja Suomen kokonaisturvallisuudesta [Secure Finland: Information on the comprehensive security of Finland]. Helsinki: Security Committee.

National Defense University, National Defense Courses, Security Committee, and Heikki Välivehmas. 2015. Turvallinen Suomi: tietoja Suomen kokonaisturvallisuudesta [Secure Finland: Information on the comprehensive security of Finland]. Helsinki: Security Committee.

Security Committee and Heikki Välivehmas. 2015. Secure Finland: Information on Comprehensive Security in Finland. Helsinki: Security Committee.

Eskola, J., C. Fjäder, K. Himberg, H. Hovi, M. Hyytiäinen, J. Kielenniva, J. Mölsä, and J. Raitasalo. 2018. Turvallinen Suomi 2018: tietoja Suomen kokonaisturvallisuudesta [Secure Finland 2018: Information on the comprehensive security of Finland]. Helsinki: Lönnberg Print and Promo. https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Turvallinen_Suomi_2018.pdf.

References

Advisory Board for Defense Information. 2021. Finns’ Opinions on Foreign and Security Policy, National Defense and Security. Helsinki: Ministry of Defense. https://www.defmin.fi/files/5275/Finns_opinions_on_foreign_and_security_policy_national_defence_and_security_2021.pdf.

Aunesluoma, Juhana, and Johanna Rainio-Niemi. 2016. “Neutrality as Identity: Finland’s Quest for Security in the Cold War.” Journal of Cold War Studies 18 (4): 51–78.

Ben-Porath, Sigal. 2007. “Civic Virtue out of Necessity: Patriotism and Democratic Education.” Theory and Research in Education 5 (1): 41–59.

———. 2011. “Wartime Citizenship: An Argument for Shared Fate.” Ethnicities 11 (3): 313–25.

Bergström, Johan. 2018. “An Archaeology of Societal Resilience.” Safety Science 110: 31–38.

Constitution of Finland, 11 June 1999 (731/1999, amendments up to 817/2018 included). https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf.

Defense Command. 2020. Soldier’s Guide 2020. Helsinki: Defense Command. https://puolustusvoimat.fi/documents/1948673/2267766/PEVIESTINTAOS_Sotilaan_k%C3%A4sikirja_2020_EN.pdf/2cff30fd-ca71-b12d-6acd-dfde73f21a6e/PEVIESTINTAOS_Sotilaan_k%C3%A4sikirja_2020_EN.pdf?t=1593147894400.

———. 2021. Henkilöstötilinpäätös 2021 (Staff Report 2021). https://puolustusvoimat.fi/documents/1948673/2267037/SST_PV_henkilo%CC%88sto%CC%88tilinpa%CC%88a%CC%88to%CC%88s_2021.pdf/07586dcc-177c-8e00-0ea9-6bf19627d34b/SST_PV_henkilo%CC%88sto%CC%88tilinpa%CC%88a%CC%88to%CC%88s_2021.pdf?t=1649416785422.

Ekholm, Peter. 2006. Ymmärrystä yli rajojen: valtakunnallisten maanpuolustuskurssien vaikuttavuus [Understanding across dividing lines: Impact of National Defense Courses]. Helsinki: Finnish National Defense University.

Eskola, Antti. 1962a. ”Yhteiskunnan säilyttämistä ja puolustamista koskevat arvostukset” [Opinions on maintaining and defending society]. Appendix 2 to Part 1, Henkisen maanpuolustuksemme perustekijät, sen kokonaistavoitteet ja eri alojen tehtävät sekä johto- ja suorituselimet rauhan ja sodan aikana [Basic components of our immaterial national defense, its goals, tasks, and branches in peace and war]. Mikkeli: Committee for Immaterial National Defense.

———. 1962b. “Yhteiskunnan säilyttämistä ja puolustamista koskevat arvostukset” [Opinions on maintaining and defending society]. Tiede ja Ase 20: 5–90.

Forsberg, Tuomas, and Matti Pesu. 2016. “The ‘Finlandisation’ of Finland: The Ideal Type, the Historical Model, and the Lessons Learnt.” Diplomacy & Statecraft 27 (3): 473–95.

———. 2017. “The Role of Public Opinion in Finnish Foreign and Security Policy.” In National Security, Public Opinion and Regime Asymmetry: A Six-Country Study, edited by Tun-jen Cheng and Lee Wei-chin, 147–73. Singapore: World Scientific.

Government of Finland. 2022. “Finland’s NATO Accession Process.” https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/finland-and-nato/accession-process.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1999. The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. Edited by Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff. Cambridge: Polity Press. Original title: Die Enbezehung des anderen: Studien zur politischen Theorie. 1996. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main.

Hadar, Maya, and Teemu Häkkinen. 2020. “Conscription and Willingness to Defend as Cornerstones of National Defense in Israel and Finland.” Journal of Political & Military Sociology 47 (2): 188–218.

Hart, Linda. 2022. “Willing, Caring, and Capable: Gendered Ideals of Vernacular Preparedness in Finland.” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society 29 (2): 405–27.

Hart, Linda, and Teemu Tallberg. 2020. ”Naiset ja maanpuolustus komiteamietinnöissä 1948–1993: toisen maailmansodan perinnöstä naisten vapaaehtoiseen asepalvelukseen” [Women and National Defense in Committee Reports 1948–1993]. In Maanpuolustustahto Suomessa [Willingness to defend Finland], edited by Teemu Häkkinen, Miina Kaarkoski, and Jouni Tilli, 128–47. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.

Hodgson, Douglas. 2016. Individual Duty within a Human Rights Discourse. London: Routledge.

Howell, William, and Douglas Kriner. 2013. “Political Elites and Public Support for War.” In Congress Reconsidered, edited by Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, vol. 10, 137–58. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Hudson, Heidi. 2005. “‘Doing’ Security as Though Humans Matter: A Feminist Perspective on Gender and the Politics of Human Security” Security Dialogue 36 (2): 155–74.

Juntunen, Tapio, and Ari-Elmeri Hyvönen. 2020. “From ‘Spiritual Defense’ to Robust Resilience in the Finnish Comprehensive Security Model.” In Nordic Societal Security, edited by Sebastian Larsson and Mark Rhinard, 154–78. London: Routledge.

Kaarkoski, Miina, and Teemu Häkkinen. 2022. “The Legitimacy of Conscription in Democracy: Connections between Conscription Politics and Public Opinion in Parliamentary Debates in Finland and Sweden in the 2010s.” Journal of Political & Military Sociology 49 (2): 195–218. https://doi.org/10.5744/jpms.2022.2004.

Kolbe, Laura. 2011. Yhteistä turvallisuutta rakentamassa [Building common security]. Helsinki: Maanpuolustuskurssiyhdistys.

Kosonen, Jarkko. 2019. Maanpuolustustahdosta maanpuolustussuhteeseen [From willingness to fight to relating to defense]. Helsinki: Finnish National Defense University.

Kosonen, Jarkko, Alisa Puustinen, and Teemu Tallberg. 2019. “Saying No to Military Service.” Journal of Military Studies 8: 46–57.

Laborde, Cécile. 2002. “From Constitutional to Civic Patriotism.” British Journal of Political Science 32 (4): 591–612.

Larsson, Oscar L. 2021. ”The Connections between Crisis and War Preparedness in Sweden.” Security Dialogue 52 (4): 306–24.

Lee, Habin, Aggeliki Tsohou, and Youngseok Choi. 2017. “Embedding Persuasive Features into Policy Issues: Implications to Designing Public Participation Processes.” Government Information Quarterly 34 (4): 591–600.

Mäkinen, Kalevi. 2007. Organisaation strateginen kokonaisturvallisuus [Strategic comprehensive security on organizations]. Helsinki: Edita.

Ministry of Defense. 2021. Development of Conscription and Fulfilling the National Defense Obligation: Report of the Parliamentary Committee. Helsinki: Finnish Government. http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-383-975-5.

National Defense Courses. 2021. Tilastotietoja maanpuolustuskursseista [Statistical information on National Defense Courses]. Appendix 5 (AR4233). [Public document of the Finnish Defense Forces]

O’Malley, Pat. 2010. “Resilient Subjects: Uncertainty, Warfare, and Liberalism.” Economy and Society 39 (4): 488–509.

Rainio-Niemi, Johanna. 2014. The Ideological Cold War: The Politics of Neutrality in Austria and Finland. London: Routledge.

———. 2019. “Managing Fragile Democracy: Constitutionalist Ethos and Constrained Democracy in Finland.” Journal of Modern European History 17 (4): 519–38.

Ruostetsaari, Ilkka. 2015. Elite Recruitment and Inner Coherence of the Inner Core of Power in Finland: Changing Patterns during the Economic Crises of 1991–2011. Lanham, MD: Lexington.

Smith, Steven B. 2021. Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Valtonen, Vesa, and Minna Branders. 2020. “Tracing the Finnish Comprehensive Security Model.” In Nordic Societal Security, edited by Sebastian Larsson and Mark Rhinard, 91–108. London: Routledge.

Viroli, Maurizio. 1995. For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Virta, Sirpa, and Minna Branders. 2016. “Legitimate Security?” British Journal of Criminology 56 (6): 1146–64.

Virtanen, Vesa. 2015. “Väistyvän pääsihteerin kynästä” [From the pen of the outgoing Secretary General]. Security Committee blog 22 Oct. 2015. https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/vaistyvan-paasihteerin-kynasta/.

1.   Finland expressed an interest in joining NATO in May 2022, and at the time of writing all but two NATO member states, Hungary and Turkey, have ratified Finland’s membership in the organization (Government of Finland 2022).

2.   The concept of “pluralist patriotism” appears in Eskola’s study for the Committee for Immaterial National Defense (Henkisen maanpuolustuksen komitea). This study was published in two versions in 1962. One was an appendix to a report by the committee (Eskola 1962a), and the second, slightly revised, was published in a Finnish war studies journal, Tiede ja Ase (Eskola 1962b).

3.   As this committee wanted to move away from the rather self-evident notion of “psychological national defense” (see also Kaarkoski and Häkkinen 2022), Juntunen and Hyvönen (2020) choose to call it “spiritual national defense.” However, as the word spiritual can refer to both mental and religious states, I choose to translate henkinen as “immaterial,” referring to its existence within the social and linguistic spheres of national defense.

4.   The percentage of women completing voluntary military service in Finland is relatively low compared to other countries, making up about 4 percent of all conscripts, male and female combined in 2020. However, the number of women completing military training annually doubled between 2015 and 2020 (Defense Command 2021).

5.   An earlier version of Secure Finland from 2015 exists also in English. See Security Committee and Välivehmas 2015.

6.   According to the National Defense Obligation in Finland, “Every Finnish citizen is obligated to participate or assist in national defense, as provided by an Act. Provisions on the right to exemption, on grounds of conscience, from participation in military national defence are laid down by an Act.” §127, Constitution of Finland (1999), unofficial translation.